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I n his genealogical analysis of male homosexualities, David Halperin summarily argues that "what homosexuality signifies today is an effect of [a] cumulative process of historical overlay 
and accretion" (91 ). Halperin proceeds from this justifiable and 
modern concept of homosexuality since it "defines the horizons of 
our immediate understanding and inevitably shapes our inquiries into 
same-sex sexual desire and behavior in the past" (90). Perhaps it 
seems obvious that no matter where gays and lesbians have come 
from, we have invariably ended up at today. Having thus arrived 
with all kinds of baggage, our cumulative understandings of 
(homo)sexual desire invariably cast long shadows, over the past and 
into the future. This is what Halperin describes as an inevitable 
"conceptual tyranny" (90), one that might be ameliorated if we let 
go of modern perceptions when we stare into our histories. 
Yet where I become stuck is Halperin's implkit notion of our 
apparent 'arrival' and what that might mean in different contexts. 
Halperin is likely just positioning a foundational beginning for 
hi storical analysis. But I'm more interested in this literal and 
figurative point as it might suggest a hi storical end. Certainly, in many 
recent queer critiques of homosexual identity (whether historical , 
political, or social), much has been made of the current assimilation 
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of lesbians and gays into the mainstream: the increasing acquisition 
of legal rights; the attempts to marry; and the frequent appearances 
on primetime American sitcoms, such as Will & Grace, to name but 
a few. What happened to the radical sexual liberation that the struggle 
for lesbian and gay equality was initially about? 
When I gave a version of this paper in Montreal in 1998, at 
Concordia University's "Sex on the Edge Conference,"' I did not 
anticipate some of the antagonism my talk subsequently engendered. 
After a number of questions, it became clear that the disagreement 
with my critique of queer theory arose from a primary source: namely, 
certain queer activists whose distinction between 'queer' and 'gay and 
lesbian ' was both theoretically discrete and served as a judgment that 
influenced their daily living. Now, as then, these self-differentiating 
queers look upon gays and lesbians as conforming and as having 
abandoned their dissenting activist roots in favor of the 'trappings' 
that flow from their adaptation of (chiefly white) economically 
middle-class identities. But what are these apparent trimmings and 
frills to which gays and lesbians have given themselves? 
I had prefaced my Montreal paper with a description of the 1993 
murder of a young Texas man, Nicholas West,2 in order to make a 
point, as I again do here, about certain presumptions of queer theory 
and activism. Queer theory at once maintains that gays and lesbians 
have finally 'arrived' and that their time has passed. It can afford 
such presumptions only because it suffers from a profound and severe 
disconnect from the varied, lived existences of self-identified 
homosexuals. I argue that queer anti-identity constructions imperil 
essential communal identification and political responsiveness, and 
offer instead individual self-centered agendas incapable of political 
engagement. Moreover, and more dangerously, this queer threat 
carries with it the implicit presumption of an eventual takeover and 
effacement of the historical locations of homosexuals, lived or 
1 
"The 'Diseased ' Homo: Queer Theory and the Re-inscription of Homophobia," 
Sex on the Edge Conference, Concordia University, Montreal , 9 Oct. 1998. Here, I 
embraced the notion that gays and lesbians still have not 'arrived ' as full. unfettered 
citizens with complete human rights. 
2 On the night of 30 Nov. 1993, West was kidnapped, beaten, made to strip, and 
repeatedly shot. His death became part of the 1997 documentary about hate crimes, 
Licensed to Kill (dir. Dong). 
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literary. As Robert K. Martin forcefully reminded the audience at 
the Montreal conference's closing plenary, the study of lesbian and 
gay history is not done. Likewise, we are not done with reimagining 
and reforming homosexual identifications and affiliations, 
problematic as they may be, because we have not 'arrived.' 
After describing West's murder, I then offered but one of many 
queer oppositional alternatives to the supposed gay and lesbian 
mainstream: a 1991 editorial from the zine BIMBOX, by the 
pseudonymous Johnny Noxema and Rex Boy. 
You are entering a gay and lesbian free zone ... Effective 
immediately, BIMBOX is at war against lesbians and gays. A 
war in which modern queer boys and queer girls are united 
against the prehistoric thinking and demented self-serving 
politics of the above-mentioned scum. BIMBOX hereby 
renounces its past use of the term lesbian and/or gay in a 
positive manner. This is a civil war against the ultimate evil, 
and consequently we must identify us and them in no 
uncertain terms ... So, dear lesbian womon [sic] or gay man 
to whom perhaps BIMBOX has been inappropriately posted ... 
prepare to pay dearly for the way you and your kind have 
fucked things up. (Qtd. in Cooper 31 )3 
The reader of this rant may either laugh and dismiss the 
overwhelming violence of the editorial as an example of the extreme 
irony embraced by the queer movement, or be taken aback by the 
nai'vete of people who, using such shock politics, underestimate the 
fact that violence that includes anything from literary gay-bashing 
to physical harm is never ironic. 
This now somewhat dated exposition, from a self-identified 
antiassimilationist movement, is not necessarily concomitant with 
queer theory, nor is its location in my discussion meant to imply that 
this is theory in practice. Yet the attack on a materialistic, commodi-
fied class of homosexuals is clear in its anti normative perfom1ativity. 
BIMBOX, given over to such textual irony, shares with its academic 
counterpart in queer theory a desire to displace a socially ingrained 
but supposedly outdated identity binarism: heterosexual/homosexual. 
3 My discussion is indebted in part to Donald Morton's analysis of the editorial , 
in his essay "Changing the Terms." 
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I regard the difference between the two- queer activism and theory 
- slender and ultimately unimportant. Whereas queer activists use 
their sexual selves and social spaces as sites or conduits for political 
intervention, queer theorists use homosexual transgression but discard 
homosexual identity in favor of a politically disinterested program 
marked by a deeply troubling deconstructive rhetoric. In responding 
to similar charges of queer political imprudence, Diana Fuss writes 
somewhat antagonistically that "politics is deployed as the final 
measuring stick for assessing the present utility, and thus the final 
relevance, of theories of gay identity" (106); and Judith Butler, fine-
tuning that sentiment, asserts that "the deconstruction of identity is 
not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political 
the very terms through which identity is articulated" (Gender Trouble 
148). It is the strangest of dances that they propose: a wary waltz 
into the domains of political expression stripped of any self-
identifying politics. To identify as "gay" or "lesbian" is deconstructed 
by Fuss and Butler only to the extent that people understand that 
such identification is a shameful engagement, as if gays and lesbians 
are not astute enough to be conscious of the pitfalls of identity 
politics. 
One cannot, at this time, completely assess the political efficacy 
of queer theory 's aims of resistance to Michael Warner 's " regimes 
of the normal" (Fear xxvi), for it is difficult to see how 
transgressive diffusions of identity can in any way present an 
immediate challenge to capitalist heteronormativity and socio-
economic inequities. After all, queer recompense seems to be an 
update of the Socratic credo that the nondeconstructed identity and 
the communal action predicated by social cross-identification is not 
worth having. In any case, the irony of queer's activist pragmatics 
and academic theoretics is that political efficacy is the opposite of 
both- as the demise of Queer Nation has already shown. BIMBox's 
editorial, as ironic textual activism, highlights in many ways the 
slippage between the two groups, especially as they both abandon 
the material homosexual subject in favor of an antihomosexual and 
anti-identitarian agency. 
The hard-won gains made by the gay and lesbian movements 
are now in danger of being surpassed by a vague, and supposedly 
more agreeable, 'gender/sexuality' agenda that, for me, evokes 
"Nothing in Particular" I 67 
suspicion, for it lends itself to a definitional ambiguity even greater 
than the one found in the word "queer." William B. Turner, in 
characterizing queer, is typical in his approval of such definitional 
indistinction; he contends that 
'Queer' has the virtue of offering, in the context of academic 
inquiry into gender identity and sexual identity, a relatively 
novel term that connotes etymologically a crossing of 
boundaries but that refers to nothing in particular, thus 
leaving the question of its denotations open to contest and 
revision. (35) 
This proposal of "nothing in particular" is all the more discomforting 
in that Turner appears sincerely to believe that offering up "nothing" 
as a template by which to argue for a social politics of progression 
or activism will somehow bypass the rapacious interests of more 
conservative movements. The conservative nature of queer (anti-) 
identity means, as Max H. Kirsch argues, that the ambiguity of a 
queer politics, in allowing itself to be usurped by conservative forces, 
"represents an opposition that does not oppose. It includes the 
spectrum of ideologies from left to right, with the caveat that the 
theory generated around it is primarily neo-conservative, suggesting 
that the organizing of collective action is all but impossible" (99). 
Thus, Turner 's mystifying pronouncement also highlights how queer 
has little to offer other than an oppositional ideology whose main 
tenet is constant contestation. 
Turner's posture strikes me as indicative of an ongoing shift in 
recent Western academic circles to promote sexuality/gender studies 
that do not take into account, at the forefront, historically specific 
homosexual identities. Instead, the adoption of que~r merely favors 
what can only be an ironically conservative move to efface any effort 
to self-identify homosexually. And it is the fear both of identity-
or being identified by way of one's (homo)sexuality- and of the 
seemingly more inclusive-sounding queer that have provided much 
of the impetus. 
Eric Savoy, in his critique of things queer, cautions that "to 
theorize homosexuality as an epistemological crisis not susceptible 
to resolution is, if not to elide the 'gay man,' at least to shift academic 
attention away from that affirmative [gay studies] position" (138). 
Hence, homosexuals, the study of them, and their studies, risk being 
passed by in favor of an adoption of indistinct queerness, whose 
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epistemological foundation is built primarily on not being seen as 
lesbian or gay. The resultant invisibility of the lesbian or gay subject 
is both figurative and literal. 
My assertions that queer anti-identity formations threaten gay 
and lesbian communal identification and political responsiveness are 
certainly not new, although I believe they retain a strong sense of 
urgency. Exemplary of queer critiques is David Van Leer's 1989 
reproof of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's political inutility and (what he 
sees as) her underwriting a homophobic thematics (Van Leer 605). 
However, I do not wish merely to repeat Van Leer's line of inquiry. 
Rather, I shall su!Vey and examine the ways in which much recent 
queer theory, in its nonadmitted drive for an ideal and deconstructed 
subject-outside-all-subjects, effectively lops off its dis-eased 
progenitor, the socially self-characterized homosexual, a subject 
ostensibly either unable or unwilling to transform her or his binarized 
and essentialist-based identity. 
Despite the demise of groups such as Queer Nation and the 
relative silence of queer social activism, queer theorizing continues, 
though it has become ever more detached from the activism that once 
inspired much of its formative drive. Queer Nation's practices, which 
eschewed homosexual identity in praise of a generalized difference, 
are more than just superficially similar to the theorists who have 
embraced such calls to difference. On the one hand, Savoy 
emphasizes that Queer Nation's commitment to concise activism 
differs from theoretical queerness's "highly suspect appropriation of 
'queerness' in challenging the very concept of 'identity' and in 
dismantling the cohesiveness that accrues at the site of the lesbian 
and the gay." Savoy's point concisely highlights the difference 
"between queer irony and irony's queerness, between the rhetoric 
of politics and deconstructive rhetoric" (142). On the other hand, it 
seems inevitable (especially considering the demise of Queer Nation) 
that a politics based on irony could only wear out its welcome- as 
with any practice that breeds familiarity - as its ability to create 
change wanes. Queer Nation's organizational tactics, such as the 
promotion of the free rein of all desire(s), are part of the 
unworkability of queer theory in the social realm. 
Likewise, queer theory suffers from an awkward relation to the 
social. Its basic premise of atomized difference and valorized 
individualism proposes that all meanings - across cultures, sex, 
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gender, race- have the possibility of becoming enacted at any time 
and in any place. This is simply impossible. A structure that would 
allow all options to exist simultaneously, so that all people could 
have access to, and possible fulfilment of, any personal choice, cannot 
exist. Such structures would involve immediate self-contradiction 
and give way to chaos. In the case of the failure of Queer Nation, 
the irrationality of this wished-for structure was overlooked, and the 
organization's demise was seen as the simple inability of different 
members to get along. 
Queer deconstructive rhetoric, especially as it permeates the 
political body, will invariably give way to the same self-destruction 
that Queer Nation faced, because such theory has a direct investment 
in getting rid of material evidence, which is to say, the homosexual 
body. 
Queer Nation's miming of civil rights sit-ins failed to reclaim 
public space precisely because queer visibility, in its use of 
(homo)sexual transgression, failed to keep up a day-to-day 
reinforcement of its project; the Queer Nation members were defeated 
by their own provisionality. Queer theorists presuppose a similar 
impermanence- much like Turner's "nothing in particular"- in 
tacitly intimating that the ongoing stimuli and the perpetual self-
critique demanded can somehow be maintained over time. Queer 
theory's naive view is that it is possible to resist heteronormative 
regimes whose investments in the status quo are prohibitively fierce, 
especially in these days of capitalistic globalism. 
In constructing this resistance, the main anti-identitarian tenets 
of the work of many queer theorists (including especially Judith 
Butler, Diana Fuss, Eve Sedgwick, and Michael Warner) disavow 
homosexual identity and propose instead that everyone is presumably 
or potentially queer. Although they reduce homosexual identity to a 
trope of transgression, they nevertheless rely on this mutinous 
category for its social and libidinal noncompliance; it is required and 
concomitantly refused. Instead of activism involving material bodies, 
however, what is proffered is activism by way of deconstructive 
rhetoric and signification. Sedgwick states, when writing of 
Foucault's questioning of regulatory sexuality, that "future 
interrogations of normative heterosexuality ... must begin from, and 
perhaps return to, the definitional centers of the achieved and loved 
'perversion.' It must also begin from gay and lesbian studies" 
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("Gender Criticism" 292). Despite her fruitful examination of the 
arbitrary nature of the ordering of sexuality and an apparent 
valorizing of gay and lesbian studies, Sedgwick's 'beginning' would 
spell the end of lesbian and gay studies, and her 'return' to this arena 
is merely an opportunity to scavenge the graveyard of gay and lesbian 
identity for the rudiments useful for constructing, in Frankenstein 
fashion, a new queer corpus. 
Sedgwick and her followers suggest that if we can change the 
terms of the argument to establish a new way to think about libidinal 
matters, we might thereby be able to regulate the rhetoric of sexuality. 
Since sex is text, or at least an effect of textual discourse, and all 
text is rhetorical in its ability to signify, a queer governance can 
change the heterosexist social apparatuses that oppress and dominate. 
But, as Donald Morton states, when writing of the privileged status 
of textuality accorded by the queer, "from the queer theory 
perspective, gayness is nothing more than a mirage of signification 
-a gay-effect" ("Changing" 12). 
If homosexuals are part of a normative order signaled by the 
heterosexual/homosexual binary, it is curious that the queer theorists 
do not call upon the (supposedly) more powerful member of the 
binary, the heterosexual. It may seem axiomatic that to hail the hetero 
position would result in the reinscription of the dominant regime, 
since there is nothing contesting or resisting about heterosexuality. 
It may seem obvious, but it needs restating: heterosexuals are in no 
way about to relinquish their privilege. As Tom Warner wryly notes, 
"There ·seems to be little evidence to suggest that there is any 
reluctance to be labelled a heterosexual" (265). I contend, how can 
queer theorists simply appropriate only what is transgressive about 
the homosexual if this category has now become subsumed by and 
part of Michael Warner's "regimes of the normal"? Has such 
transgression not already been influenced or appropriated by the 
dominant group? 
These unexamined assumptions result in the blaming of 
homosexuals for their own positioning in the social framework. The 
irony is that the queer position deftly merges with a reactionary 
conservative one. When queer BIMBOX attacks homosexuals as having 
been complicit in their own ruin, there remains amid the rubble of 
their irony a residual suspicion that homosexuals, possessing 
coherent, rational identities, have been collaborators in maintaining 
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a status quo society.4 While one might look upon BIMBox 's musings 
as entirely ironic in their efforts to shake up complacent gays and 
lesbians, the subterfuge elicits quite a literal reinscription of 
homophobia. When Cooper asserts that Noxema and Rex Boy "pose 
questions about identity that are as lushly poetic as they are 
superficially irresponsible" and that "to become engaged in their 
illogic is to sense the idiocy that goes hand in hand with delusions 
of a united front" (31 ), he suggests that the textual ironizing of a 
supposedly coherent and united homosexual subject is required to 
make these queer writers' point. Therefore, ·attacking homosexuals 
cannot cause harm because homosexual material existence has been 
transformed into an allegory and is thus not the ' real thing.' Gays, 
as signified beings within the queer textual world, are simply, as 
Morton states, "gay-effects." They have lost a sense of material being 
and, despite Judith Butler 's remonstrance (in Bodies That Matter), 
they are bodies that do not matter. To use this queer textual logic, 
Nicholas West died because of faulty identification as a gay man; 
but if he had not been an out gay man, his death would probably not 
have occurred. 
BIMBOX's use of violence as critique cannot help but recall 
the real material lives of gay men and lesbians who have suffered, 
today and in history.5 The editorial writers might protest that they, 
though queer, are interested in same-sex sex.6 Yet at this juncture, 
where practice violently combines with a theory of emancipation, 
the resulting discourse cancels out the homosexual subject. Rising 
phoenixlike from the ashes of this infemal collision is the unscathed 
4 The verve of much, but by no means all , recent gay and lesbian activism has 
been ass imilationist. Tom Warner deftly summarizes the queer critique: "Rights 
advocacy and promotion of identity. perhaps inevitably, become conservati ve 
influences that eventually impede and then outrightly resist the more radical objectives 
of liberation and sexual freedom. A synergy of rights attainment and identities that 
are respectable and non-threatening to the heterosexual mainstream takes hold. and 
becomes itself constraining and oppressive, marginalizing those who do not, or refuse 
to, conform" (263). 
5 I do not suggest than the litmus test of lesbian and gay identity and ex istence 
should be suffering, although it is important to remind ourse lves of historical fact. 
6 Even this is debatable. Johnny Noxema, in his interview with Cooper. says 
(ironically?) that "For my friends and myself, sex is the last thing on our minds" 
(32). 
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heterosexual who can blame homosexual deviance as the cause of 
unrest. When interviewed by Cooper, Noxema, in his rally against 
gays, notes that Jeffrey Dahmer picked up one of his victims at a 
gay pride parade. This is, no doubt, seen as ironic by Noxema; 
nonetheless, his joking implies that both perpetrator and victim 
deserve one another, that if it had not been for their identification as 
gay no violence would have occurred. Not only is violence against 
and/or by homosexuals positioned as innately homosexual, but it is 
thematized as such within the theoretical understanding that 
homosexuals have caused their own (violent) displacement by dint 
of their faulty essentialized nature. 
Why Fear a Queer Planet? 
Given the ongoing struggles of homosexuals- including the effort 
to stay alive - I find it strange that queer theorist Michael Warner 
remarks, when addressing the admirable accomplishments of gays 
and lesbians, that "the success of that work now makes some other 
kinds of thinking necessary" (Fear x). This is invariably the kind of 
statement made by those who are privileged enough not to have to 
worry about random violence, the effects of racism, sexism, and, 
especially, class. Warner's enveloping of gay and lesbian history 
within a theoretical dynamic is not surprising considering that in 
order for queer theory to take over, it must dispense with the 
homosexual body and the politics attendant upon such material 
existence, and at the same time spirit away the representation of the 
homosexual required for transgressive practices. Warner's assertion 
of a dubious "success" neatly allows him to remark upon (and 
appropriate) what has perhaps been a success - more queer 
academics?- and leave the scraps of essentialism around for queers 
like Cooper to pick up, recycle, and demonize once more. 
For queer practice, according to Michael Warner, there remains 
the nonmedical, nonradical, and nonphysical issues of "challeng[ing] 
the common understanding of what gender difference means, or what 
the state is for, or what 'health' entails, or what would define fairness, 
or what a good relation to the planet's environment would be" (Fear 
xiii). But he elides the idea that similar practices were once vaunted 
by the radical gay left in the early 1970s. Warner shifts the issue 
from efficacy to 'difference'- not differences between people but 
differences within the self that reveal the constructed, contingent, 
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and ambiguous nature of identity. One might gather from this that 
homosexuals possess a hazardous, binarized essence that univer-
salizes the notion of difference, whereas queers, in disrupting 
essentialism, do "a kind of practical social reflection just in finding 
ways of being queer" (Fear xiii). 
This kind of navel-gazing reveals that Warner's project 
encourages a self-concerned individualism and is, in fact, antisocial. 
Again advocating the possibility of a queer entity possessing all the 
expressive punch of 'have-a-nice-day' sentiments, Warner's 2002 
book describes the queer world as "a space of entrances, exits, 
unsystematized lines of acquaintance, projected horizons, typifying 
examples, alternate routes, blockages, incommensurate geographies" 
(Publics 198). But what exactly does this mean? Again, Turner 's 
"nothing in patticular" provides a fitting response. Yet Warner's 
watery rhetoric does serve a purpose: it underscores a projected and 
hoped-for unfettered individualism disconnected from the social and 
unable to form a radical or emancipatory politics of any sort. Warner 
asserts that queer politics invokes "norms of liberal modernity such 
as self-determination and self-representation ... [and] it continues to 
value sexuality by linking it to the expressive capacities of 
individuals"; and he resolutely determines that queer theory "relies 
absolutely on norms of expressive individualism and an under-
standing of sexuality in terms of those norms" (Publics 219). 
That people operate, generally, from the locus of self is 
undeniable. But they also act communally in order to further their 
own interests, especially those they may share with others. Although 
Michael Warner's queers might be able to promote radical notions 
of sexuality, it cannot be that they could do so together, a basic 
requirement of political action. Lost as they are while exploring those 
"projected horizons" of the queer world, Warner's fellow pilgrims 
are also lost to each other since their lines of acquaintance are 
unsystematized. How would they recognize not only each other but 
what each other believes has to be done? 
It is telling that Warner contradicts himself by stating that "queer 
politics is anti-assimilationist, non-individualist, and mobilizes non-
communitarian practices of public-sphere media" (Publics 221 ). 
Perhaps Warner means that such politics are nonindividualist simply 
because there cannot be anything political organized on a queer 
planet. Warner's queer theory, while getting on with the serious work 
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of deconstructive understandings of the nonmaterial world, evokes 
an ever inward-looking world of atomized persons finding ways to 
be more themselves, the ultimate identity. Kirsch calls this the '" I 
matter most' philosophy in which individualism, subversion, and 
social resistance are equated. This conjoining of complex issues is 
encouraged by a culture that is now more than ever oriented towards 
separating the individual from the social, promoting an ideal that 
we are all unique, special, unfettered by structural forces outside our 
control" (3). From Warner's perspective, there is no continuity 
between people as libidinal localities are prioritized; each person, in 
becoming his or her own unique 'moment in history,' nurtures a 
passion for the self that supersedes communal action or political 
interests. 
For Warner, "queer sexuality is like gender or race in being a 
political fonn of embodiment that is defined as noise or interference 
in the disembodying frame of citizenship" (Fear xix-xx). This is a 
significant point, but here, the embodied queer person is progressive 
only insofar as he or she disturbs; to what (political) end is not known 
since queers disdain a strictly goal-oriented politics, especially since 
such prescriptions tend to play into the predetennining hegemony 
of a coherent, stable, heterononnative ideology. The main tenet of 
"practical social reflection," defined by Warner, is "the project of 
elaborating, in ways that cannot be predicted in advance, this 
question: What do queers want?" (Fear vii). This view, shared by 
other queer theorists (Butler, Bodies 229; Gender Trouble 7; Fuss 
I 06; Sedgwick, Epistemology 12), underscores a disinterested risk 
politics that is commensurate with abandoning essentialized 
collectivities. 
Outdated lesbian and gay collective political action, Michael 
Warner elaborates, reinforces the regulatory framework of binarized 
structures since, he implies, the homosexual is part of "nonnalcy." 
Warner asserts that the queer is "an aggressive impulse of 
generalization; it rejects a minoritizing logic of toleration or simple 
political interest representation in favor of a more thorough resistance 
to regimes of the nonnal" (Fear xxvi). But I find that the idea that 
the homosexual subject has suddenly shifted from the margins into 
the centrality implied by "nonnal" would likely be startling (though 
for opposing reasons) to a large number of heterosexuals and 
homosexuals alike. Such queer resistance, fighting for necessarily 
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unanticipated effects, ultimately leaves itself open to appropriation 
by normative ideological structures, since it is these structures that 
will co-opt unregulated activity. Resistance by directionless atomized 
entities is not enough. 
Neither is opposition in the form of "tempered rage and 
carnivalesque display" (Fear xvii). These methods of social release 
do little to transgress the temper of society, though Warner is quick 
to add that it is the normalizing feature of society that also must be 
resisted. Resistance in itself, however, as a ctitique or a call to action, 
implies direction; Warner omits - notwithstanding his push for a 
nonteleological project - that every argument produces its own 
dominance and will carry with it ideological implications. Warner 
believes that queers can become ideology-free (or at least free of 
dominant ideologies) through rigorous resistance that would never 
allow any ideology to settle. 
But queering's appeal to constant contestation and disturbance 
will only become its own ideology: the ideology of change. Warner, 
seeing change as perpetual motion, confuses his apparent favoring of 
the choice of embracing all random directions with the simple ability 
to choose; the latter signals direction, even when the choice is 
resistance, whereas the former implies the impossibility that all 
direCtions can function within a structure at the same time. Of these 
queer attempts to subvert identity, Stephen Seidman writes that in 
queer theory there is "a celebration of liminality, of the spaces 
between or outside structure, a kind of anarchistic championing of 
'pure' freedom from all constraints and limits" (" Identity" 133). It 
appears queer theory courts anarchy or chaos, only it becomes dis-
guised by "risking the incoherence of identity" (Butler, Bodies 113). 
Sounding much like Michael Warner, Judith Butler too sees 
queerness as a sort of disrupting, disembodied agency whose only 
force is a constant redeployment against (rationally coherent) identity. 
She maintains that identities produce exclusions and abjections and 
therefore fail to make connections across the very differences that 
are needed to (re)democratize coalitional frames. This 'new 
democracy' entails a rejection of the essentialized homosexual subject 
who is part of what Butler calls the "socially instituted and 
maintained norms of intelligibility" (Gender Trouble 16-17). 
Emphasizing the specific and the local throughout her work, she 
advocates "the possibility of agency and transformation" (Gender 
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Trouble 7) but, as Seidman notes ("Deconstructing" 137), she never 
describes the inherent possibilities entailed by her project's 
destination. 
Butler, not surprisingly, appears to backtrack somewhat from a 
thorough constructivist position by suggesting a kind of essentialism 
that would, she states, "affirm identities that are alternately instituted 
and relinquished according to the purposes at hand; [the open 
coalition] will be an open assemblage that permits of multiple 
convergences and divergences without obedience to a normative telos 
of definitional closure" (Gender Trouble 16). This ploy of strategic 
essentialism, found elsewhere among queer theorists (Edelman xvi; 
Fuss 105), allows for identity with the assurance that such strategies 
are required to tap the transgression afforded by homosexual 
subjectivity. But if queer theory, as Savoy says, "locates 
homosexuality in suspension or liminality, and thus suspends the 
coherence of identity politics" (137), how can an invisible subject 
continue to underwrite dissent? Butler is interested in identity only 
as a "point of convergence" across differences (Gender Trouble 10), 
but she says little about either identity as socially revealed or what 
might compel solitary queers to come together to effect change, 
political or otherwise. 
With the disappearance of homosexual identity under Butler's 
queer reign, the expression of homophobia is given a much freer 
rein since there would be, under a queer regime, no homosexual 
subjects to combat the homophobic subject (Bersani 56). However, 
Butler subtly admits that a concrete homosexuality might be at times 
yielded to if it can effect a queer collective contestation ("Critically 
Queer" 14).7 But she never states just what constitutes an effective 
body politic, or how one might assume with assurance that all its 
members will share the same (contesting) interests, or how 
individuals sustain over time the stimuli to fuel an ever-aware and 
always-ready queer critical reasoning. 
These questions accentuate one of the main problems of much 
queer theory: if all identities are locally conferred, how can queer 
7 Although she never directly says 'homosexual communal politically-based 
identity,' Butler leaves that possibility open when she says that the term "queer," as a 
site of collective contestation, is "perhaps also yielded in favor of terms that do the 
political work more effectively" ("Critically Queer" 14). 
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values develop or change when interaction among individuals at a 
level above the immediate is not thoroughly engaged or considered? 
Lisa Bower intriguingly argues that "we have seen the development 
of different types of political practice which invoke political identities 
that do not ask the law for recognition" (281). This supports a 
populist perception that individuals can effect change merely through 
dissidence, or by fuelling an inward-looking identity that is always 
differentfi'om. In other words, they hope to create change by simply 
being but not necessarily acting. A self-centered will-to-power cannot 
contest anything, especially as unwillingness to identify interests 
beyond mere contestation will result in dominant self-interest groups 
doing it for the queer individuals who desultorily contest. 
Bower 's hope for a more immediate address to political 
problems is laudable. Yet without apparent structures beyond the 
atomized self by which to express desired change, it is difficult to 
know what fruitful contestations of any kind queers might achieve, 
in theory or in practice. Rather than using material beings providing 
visibility, Bower instead provides a straw person of "marginalized 
communities," which somehow share a transparent interest in 
common values. For example, Bower prescribes that queers "use 
legal descriptions of homosexuality to create contestation in the 
public sphere, to re-imagine community and to transform the political 
field by challenging community members' own identifications" 
(283). The homosexual as a transgressive but community-identified 
force seems paradoxical and untenable; moreover, queering advocates 
the intensification of localized groups in their marginalities, to the 
point where larger group action becomes impossible. The result is 
that certain groups who see an opportunity to promote their own 
agenda or who seek dominance will fill any political vacuum. 
It is strikingly nai've to imagine that dominant groups would take 
positive action to respond to the minority group assertions that claim 
that societies regularly enforce misrecognition of the violence 
wrought through heteronormativity. Bower suggests that a "renewal 
of community and politics may occur through a politics of direct 
address enacted through cultural interventions and there-imagination 
of community" (283). Favoring the tactics of Queer Nation's mall 
kiss-ins, Bower imagines that direct address, as a form of populism, 
can effectively disrupt and alienate heteronormative structures so that 
resulting ruptures will lead to greater (re)creation and reconfiguration 
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of minority social spheres. To elide identity politics, Bower proposes 
a strategically selective "role of identification" (285) wherein 
difference, conceived as value-neutral, cannot depend on one thing 
or another for its constitution. Therefore, homosexual identity (in a 
queer world), because it coheres everywhere (as part of the regime 
requiring its transgressive nature) , really would cohere at no 
particular site (Savoy 150). Difference, as a somewhat abstract 
organizing concept - which, because it is queer, likely would not 
organize in a coherent fashion - presumes a largely invisible, 
apolitical, incoherent structure with no one (identity) in particular at 
its helm. Queer work, beyond dissidence, has no direction and insists 
upon not choosing one. Clearly, these kinds of proposals are 
antisocial in that there is no real constituency except for the self-
regarding individual. Identity politics, though in some ways flawed, 
has at least the fundamentals of cross-social concern and 
identification working for it. 
Reviving the Social 
This queer politics, especially as it utilizes a deconstructive critique 
of identity, conceals subjectivity within a rhetoric of composite 
intersections. If constructed identity categories are unstable because 
of what they exclude, queer (anti-)identities are even less stable 
because of their multifaceted, porous natures. It would, of course, 
be too simple to say that queers want to do away with identity 
altogether, since people will invariably converge at some point, 
arbitrarily or otherwise. Rather, queers hope to open up identity 
categories as sites of contestation. The notion of strategic essentialism 
again arises, as Seidman observes that "the aim is not to abandon 
identity as a category of knowledge and politics but to render it 
permanently open and contestable as to its meaning and political role. 
In other words, decisions about identity categories become pragmatic, 
related to concerns of situational advantage, political gain, and 
conceptual utility" ("Introduction" 12). 
But at these new sites, whose voices are heard and whose inter-
ests are pandered to? If queers struggle to abandon the baggage of 
binarized identity, for example, can one actually expect any subject to 
be available to speak for their positions? The problem is that queer 
theory, like much self-referential resistance theory, cannot support a 
position like Bower's politics of direct address; it is a theory that can-
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not constitute a workable politics since it is concerned foremost with 
individuals acting discretely. Difference between persons gives way 
to an examination of difference within a person without external 
referents. The queer goal is to call forth and contest the knowledge 
and social practices inherent in (self) identity and desire, but this 
sounds much like the isolated individual who becomes the creator of 
self, as the fount of an atomized and socially disengaged knowledge. 
In ways similar to how paradoxical postmodernism predicates 
its existence on modernism, queer theory and practice seize upon 
identity as a necessity for its anti-identity project. However, again 
we see that queer practitioners, in their efforts to look ever more 
inward to understand the epistemologically bordered locus of self, 
begin to resemble the modernist artist who attempted to translate 
the world through his or her own mind. Although not quite that 
simplistic, queer theory nonetheless cannot argue the effects of and 
arousals caused by the trappings of power. The queer recreation of 
identities heretofore di smissed as constituting a rational, coherent, 
and normalizing category results in politically disinterested subjects 
whose only engrossments are revealed to be an encompassing self-
interest. Queer offers up the seductive right to dissent as individuals; 
there is no inducement to dissent collectively. 
Yet to promote stability in order to pursue other noncontesting 
interests, the subject will resort to the structures that regulate activity 
for him or her, most notably, the law, among other social 
configurations. Vying for power - who has it, who can use it, to 
what end - needs to be reified and reinscribed in order to promote 
a force of stability that will allow time for subjects to be social. As 
Kirsch rightly asserts, when writing about how the involvement of 
individuals drives social action, these concerned subjects "need to 
have structural representation in order to maintain the energy needed 
for sustained opposition. Individuals working against their 
oppressors, whether in the workplace or neighborhood, cannot 
succeed without a mechanism that can play a larger role in 
incorporating them into communities of resistance where mutual 
recognition is present" ( 118). The internalized structures that are 
required in order for us to interact are also part of the environments 
in which we get to act, to mediate actions, to be social. 
But social division, which seems to be the promise of a post-
structuralist critique of identity, only promises more fragmentation 
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under the aegis of the sign of the queer, resulting in only more 
isolation and doubt about the possibilities of communal action. The 
sanctioning of nonidentity becomes as regulatory as it presumably 
is under the current regimes of binarized norms. As the queer 
becomes increasingly theorized in the academy, fears are being 
expressed about the possibility of its homogenization. The totalizing 
effects of an omnipresent late-capitalist ideology, which sets up 
deviance only to co-opt it, would seem to be the likely suspect of 
this homogenizing maneuver. As Morton points out, "Queer Theory 
is now recognized as nothing but an ideological maneuver to enable 
the assimilation of queers to mainstream economic practices, which 
is to say, the assimilation of those on the sexual margins to the free 
market" ("Pataphysics" 5). Morton forcefully argues that material 
conditions, not a libidinalized economy, should be prioritized in order 
to bring about true liberation. 
Morton compares the effects of the economic boom in the 1990s 
- what he calls "the Age of Difference" - with the long postwar 
economic expansion in the United States. In the 1950s to the 1970s, 
"the emphasis of Gay Liberation was on inclusion in the common 
economic resources of capitalist democracy in spite of d!flerences, 
[whereas] in the Age of Difference, the emphasis of Queer Theory 
is on inclusion in global capitalist democratic rights to consumption 
tailored to differences" (14). Although I think Morton means to 
include consumerist-oriented gays and lesbians in that category of 
consumption, he nevertheless adroitly points out how the queer has 
been cocopted due to his or her lack of engagement in reimagining 
the social. Indeed, unless queer theory's 'niche' politics can prompt 
reconceptualizations in social spheres (wherein it must present itself 
as a desirable alternative in order to confront investments in current 
dominating structures), change wrought through a refiguring of the 
self as simply 'different' will remain only conceptual. 
The question of how queer theory itself functions as a practice 
of differences arises when Michael Warner states that "people want 
to make theory queer" (Fear xxvi).8 One wonders how queer theory, 
8 The idea of queering everything is modified somewhat in Warner 's recent work. 
Here he states that the new use of queer "does not simply replace or expand the ones 
[such as lesbian and gay] . It competes with them and, if taken literally, will rule out 
many of the people whom the revaluation of the term was meant to serve" (Publics 316). 
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roaming within a deconstructed redefinition of a politics of 
difference(s), could even recognize itself, let alone other theories. 
Under the queer rubric that this, for example, is something that could 
not be anticipated (and thus not known), queering quickly becomes 
a theory of atomized differences traveling along intersecting 
structures that, altogether, cannot recognize strategic positions of 
contestation since such configurations (under a queer gaze) are 
without structural identification. Theory, in this instance, is strangely 
dislocated from its material subject, although queer theory, 
presumably willing to participate in its own critique, threatens itself 
with its own relegation to liminality. It is as though the scare quotes 
that once accompanied the word "queer" would, in an ironic reversal, 
return and extend the quotes to encompass not only scare-quoted 
"queer" but the word "theory" as well. As a tool signaling irony, 
such scare quotes serve as a counterpart to what might be the 
embodiment of a queer person: the scarecrow. Each signals an ironic 
existence, and neither cannot signal or be a material body. 
It is also ironic that queer theory 's double imperative - to 
maintain the integrity of critical distance while actively disturbing 
the foundation of the subject - works to undo itself, in theory and 
in practice. Such a disappearance can only be the result of an 
insistence on submission to a deconstructive taxonomy. However, it 
would be extremely nai"ve to think that this spells the end of queer 
theory. Although it may not maintain its own distinctive categori-
zation, especially within the academy, its mission, as stated by 
Michael Warner, to queer all theory, is not unwelcome. Queer theory, 
despite its foundation in social constructionism, anti-identity 
formulations, and homosexual transgression, must still rely on the 
identification of 'the homosexual ' and keep this category in visible 
circulation. But if it does not resolve the impasse created by its 
suspension or deferral of homosexual subjectivity and political 
strategies, queer theory will only continue to undermine its 
homosexual base by, as Savoy alleges, smuggling homophobia "in 
through the back door," thereby reinscribing a view of homosexuality 
as "highly dispensable" (134 ). Queers must stop disposing of the 
homosexual either through theoretical necessity or through 
(unintentional) social abnegation. 
The resolve of this impasse seems to return us to Butler's call 
to a form of strategic use of identity categories or subject positions 
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as warranted. However, just who will make that determination 
without resorting to forms of dominance is yet another paradox to 
overcome. There appears no emancipation eminent in the queer 
project beyond a studied self-examination that presumably frees the 
psyche and creates another version of ' the best possible you, ' a 
concept ironically promoted as the promise of capitalism 's modem 
advertising campaigns. As Kirsch wryly notes, "queer theory's 
highlighting of the impossibility of identity and the relativity of 
experience closely follows the development of current capitalist 
relations of production, where the self-contained individual is central 
to the economic goal of creating profit through production and its 
by-product, consuming" ( 17 -18). He adds, echoing Morton, that the 
tenets of queer theory do not resist the capitalist production of 
equality but have paradoxically mirrored it. 
Rather than come to terms with the efficacy inherent in 
expansive and corrective forms of sexual identity politics, queers 
have simply been recuperated by the forces of consumerist 
production. Queer theory has initiated a politics of irresolution while 
focusing on its ironic "disciplining compulsory imperative to remain 
undifferentiated" (Seidman, "Identity" 133). It appears unable to 
recognize that political disinterest is a liability and prey to 
conservative political recuperation. The additional inability of queer 
theory to react quickly or in any substantive way to immediate needs 
is another pitfall. The necessary risk of a 'pure' queer project cannot 
be undertaken without reestablishing and reaffirming its roots in the 
visible communities from which it arises and to which it must answer. 
I thank Robert K. Martin and Lianne Moyes for their comments on 
an earlier draft of this paper. 
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